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ECONOMIC CRISIS IN ARGENTINA AND NO WAY OUT?*
I. Introduction
1. Argentina has made the headlines of international media
not only for its successful return to democratic political
rules in December 1983 but also for its renewed slump into
economic crisis. The country is no longer able to meet the
debt servicing requirements and to repay loans due this year
while auspices for rescheduling and extending foreign debt are
bleak. As a corollary tovexternal problems, there are high
public sector deficits, inflation is accelerating at a galop-
ping pace, and net private investment has turned negative. Up
to now, the new democratic government has not lived up to
expectations since it did not present a reform package
designed to overcome the severe economic problems of the
country. Rather, the government has relied on some ad-hoc
emergency measures in an attempt to prevent the crisis from
turning into catastrophy. Such "muddling through" approaches
to economic policy making have frequently been applied in
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a research
project carried out on behalf of the Friedrich-Naumann-Stif-
tung. The larger part of the project was undertaken in
Buenos Aires between June 15 and August 24, 1984. The re-
search team included the authors and Juergen B. Donges, who
prepared a summary of the main findings in Spanish [Donges,
1984]. An in-depth analysis of fiscal and monetary policies
is provided in Fischer and Trapp [1984a, 1984b]. The authors
are grateful to a large number of economists both in the
government and the private sector for helpful suggestions
concerning the analysis and comments on the policy recom-
mendations. In Buenos Aires, Jorge Galmes provided invalu-
able assistance in organizing the research work and estab-
lishing important contacts. The analysis was concluded on
August 24, 1984.- 2 -
Argentina and have frequently failed to achieve the stated
objectives. Instead, a deteriorating performance of the
economy used to increase social tension and finally forced the
government out of office. To prevent a repetition of this
dreadful experience, the present government has no other
choice but to thoroughly review its economic policies and to
implement policy changes which take into account the under-
lying causes of repeated economic crises in Argentina rather
than only the symptoms of these crises as was done in the
past.
2. The subsequent analysis of economic performance and policy
making in Argentina over the last 15 years isolates major
obstacles to achieving a period of sustained economic growth
and stability in the country and shows why government inter-
vention as well as successive liberalization attempts have
failed to produce the desired results (Chapters II and III).
Against this background, stabilization policies applied by the
present government are reviewed (Chapter IV) and confronted
with a stabilization cum restructuring program which could be
successful in overcoming the basic deficiencies of the
Argentine economy (Chapter V).- 3 -
II. Economic Policies and Economic Performance in the
1970-1983 Period
3. The more recent economic history of Argentina has to be
viewed against the country's earlier successes . In the pre-
World War I period Argentina enjoyed about 70 years of rapid
and almost uninterrupted growth which put the country in the
ranks of industrialized nations. Argentina benefitted from its
vast natural resources and swiftly expanded its exports of
agricultural products. At the beginning of this century, real
per capita income was higher than in Italy and Austria and
about as high as. in France. The development in the inter-war
period was strongly influenced by the Great Depression which
led to a sharp reduction of Argentine exports. All in all,
however, the country did not fare worse than many other
economies at that time, and during World War II, Argentina
recovered notably. Although external conditions for economic
growth as measured by the expansion of markets and the
availability of funds and know-how were favourable after the
War, the increase in aggregate output was much weaker and more
unstable and inflation was much higher in Argentina than in
most other countries in that period. What is even worse, the
post-war period was characterized by a sequence of economic
crises and a persistent deterioration of the performance of
the Argentine economy (Figure 1).
For an analysis of the economic history of Argentina, see
Diaz-Alejandro [1970 and 1982] and Mallon and Sourrouille
[1975].- 4 -
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4. An analysis of economic policies over the last 10-15 years
provides some clues as to why economic management was success-
ful, if at all, only in the very short term. A synopsis of
major changes in economic policies introduced by the succes-
sive governments is given in Table 1. This synopsis and the
macroecohomic data presented in Table 2 demonstrate that the
present crisis is by no means as extraordinary as it might
appear at first glance. It is rather the last link in a chain
of economic crises which, notwithstanding their respective
characteristics, seem to stem from similar underlying causes.
5. The year 1969 marks the end of the Krieger Vasena stabili-
zation plan. Under this plan, the rate of inflation had been
brought down from more than 20 p.c. per annum to less than 10
p.c, the government deficit declined to about 1 p.c. of GDP,
and foreign exchange reserves were replenished. A major
recession had been avoided by allowing monetary expansion to
accelerate again, following a temporary credit tightening at
the beginning of the plan. The plan was geared to real income
targets and to a fixed exchange rate which was expected to
keep the rate of inflation at a low level. However, both
targets became untenable when a construction boom stimulated
by low interest rates gained momentum in 1969. Wage and price
increases picked up again and led to a revaluation of the real
rate of exchange which contributed to a decline in agri-
cultural prices thus starting yet another cattle cycle [Mallon
and Sourrouille, 1975:32].— 6 —






Main Economic Policies Pursued
June 1970 General Levingston





Devaluations of the $ a to solve the balance of payment
problem. Expansive monetary and fiscal policies to stimu-
late economic activity.
May 1973 J.D. Per&n
July 1974 M.E.M. Per6n
Gelbard Massive increase of real wages to stimulate domestic
Gomez Morales demand. Fixed exchange rate and price controls in order
Cafiero to reduce inflation. Expansive monetary and fiscal policy.
April 1976 General Videla Martinez de Hbz Emergency program: strong devaluations, ceilings
on nominal wages, ease of price controls, steps to reduce
the fiscal deficit. 1977 attempt to establish a free
market economy (lift of price controls, liberalization of
interest rates) and opening up of the economy to inter-
national competition (partial elimination of export taxes,
exchange rate guarantees). 1979 a pre-announced crawling peg
system (tablita) was introduced. After an initial tightening
of monetary and fiscal policy the policy stance was reversed
in the course of the period.
March 1981 General Viola Sigaut Abolition of the crawling peg in favour of ad hoc devalua-
tions. Split of the exchange market into a controlled com-
mercial market and a financial market with free floating
exchange rates. Financing of the increasing public deficit
by bond sales to the private sector. Monetary policy de-
signed to the financing needs of the public sector deficit
and ensuring liquidity of the private sector.
Dae. 1981 General Galtieri Alemann Free floating and re-unified exchange rates. Restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy to reduce inflation.
June 1982 General Bignone Dagnino Pastore Renewed introduction of a crawling peg system. Refinancing
Wehbe of private debt through long-term loans at a highly nega-
tive real rate of interest in order to prevent a breakdown
of major parts of the industry and the banking sector.
Dec. 1983 R. Alfonsin Grinspun Active income policy (increase of real minimum wages and
granting cost of living adjustment to higher wage brackets)
combined with efforts for a socio-economic pact. Devalua-
tions according to the expected rate of inflation. Price
controls for industrial products and ceilings on wage in
creases in private companies. Severe import controls. Per-
sistently high public sector deficits.
Tist does not include Ministers who served less than 6 months. - LJuring an interim period after the election
the government was led by Campora and Lasteri.Table 2 - Basic Economic Indicators, Argentina 1970-1983
Per-Capita Public Sector Bank Credit Money
Year Income Deficit to the Pri- Supply
(Percentage (P.c.of GDP) vate Sector Ml











































































































































































aAt 1970 constant prices; Non-financial public sector;
 cCurrency in circulation and demand deposits; Consumer prices of Greater
Buenos Aires, annual average; $ a per US-$; Since 1982 parallel market; "includes net current transfers; (-)
in reserves; Estimate.
increase
Source: BCRA, FIEL, IFS.- 8 -
6. As devaluation expectations emerged and the current ac-
count moved into deficit the emphasis in exchange rate policy
shifted from fighting inflation to solving the balance of
payments problem. From 1970 to 1972, the Peso was allowed to
devalue by some 60 p.c. Since the authorities did not want the
unemployment rate to rise, monetary and fiscal policy became
increasingly expansionary. In 1972, the fiscal deficit in
terms of GDP was 5 times higher than in 1970 and the increase
in the money stock amounted to roughly 40 pv6i (Table 2). As a
result of this policy, inflation accelerated to nearly 60 p.c.
per annum in 1972. However, the balance of payments improved
because of the devaluation and in 1973, when the Peronist
government was elected, the current account was comfortably in
surplus and there was an increase in foreign reserves.
7. The main objective of the new government under Juan Peron
(Table 1) was to increase real wages and to achieve a high
level of economic activity. To reduce the rate of inflation,
price controls were introduced and the exchange rate was fixed
again in 1973. The fiscal deficit rose to about 7 1/2 p.c. of
GDP and the rate of growth of the money supply almost doubled
to some 75 p.c. While real wages increased sharply, price
controls kept the rate of inflation at 24 p.c. in 1974 (Table
2). The result was that there were black markets for almost
all kinds of goods [Cavallo and Petrei, 1983: 157], In 1975,
the government was no longer able to repress inflation. The
index of consumer prices (CPI) rose dramatically and, in the
first quarter of 1976, the annual rate of inflation amounted- 9 -
to 900 p.c. The government deficit was twice as high as in
1973 and the current account registered a deficit of 1.3 bill.
US-$. Real output declined in 1975 and 1976 for the first time
since 1963 (Figure 1) .
8. In spring 1976, a military government under General Videla
took office and tried to stabilize the economy by applying
some emergency measures (Table 1). The Peso was devalued by
about 80 p.c, a ceiling on nominal wages was introduced,
price controls were eased, and steps were taken to reduce the
government deficit. Real wages fell by about one third. Lower
wage costs, the devaluation of the currency and the
elimination of export taxes led to a marked expansion of
exports. For the year as a whole the current account was in
surplus again and the decline in foreign reserves was
reversed.
Whereas the 1975 drop in aggregate output was mainly due to
lower exports, it was the decline in domestic demand that led
to the 1976 reduction of real GDP (Table Al). Monetary expan-
sion remained nonetheless high because the Central Bank had to
monetize huge losses from subsidized sales of US-$ in the
futures market undertaken by the previous government. For the
year 1976 as a whole, the increase of the CPI amounted to 441
p.c, however, with a declining trend during the year. The
budget deficit as well as the increase in the money stock had
been considerably reduced in the second half of 1976, but at
the end of the year both variables were still high and in
excess of the levels prevailing from 1970 to 1974 (Table 2).- 10 -
9. In 1977, the Martinez de Hoz plan was implemented, which
was based on the idea of fighting inflation be reestablishing
the conditions of a free market economy and by opening up the
economy to international competition . While price controls
were lifted after a transitional period, wages remained under
strict government control.
After the correction of monetary and fiscal trends in 1976,
policies were again relaxed somewhat in 1977. There was a
noticeable recovery of economic activity with both domestic
expenditure and exports expanding at a rapid pace. The current
account continued to improve and the rate of inflation
declined, but by far not as much as the government had
envisaged. Therefore, monetary policy was tightened again in
1978. Since the government's credit requirements remained high
in view of the large budget deficit, real interest rates
increased steeply. This produced another recession of domestic
demand in 1978. The share of domestic absorption in aggregate
supply (GDP plus imports) decreased by 5 percentage points
compared to 1975 (Table Al).
10. Since the rate of inflation remained high, the government
introduced a pre-announced crawling peg (tablita) in 1979
which was designed in such a way as to keep price increases of
traded goods more in line with international inflation. The
tablita was expected to break inflationary expectations in the
domestic market. However, the government did not adjust the
This liberalization attempt has been widely described in the
literature, see e.g. McKinnon [1982], Sjaastad [1983],
Wogart [1983], and Barletta et al. [1984].- 11 -
stance of monetary and fiscal policies which were inconsistent
with the planned reduction of the inflation rate. In addition,
real wages were raised substantially in 1979. The result was a
consumption-induced recovery in 197 9 with domestic expenditure
increasing at a rate of about 12 p.c. Since the higher
domestic wage costs were not compensated for by the crawling
peg, the international competitiveness of the domestic
industry was sharply reduced and exports declined while
imports of goods and services (in real terms) surged by about
50 p.c. in 1980 (Table A2). The competitive position of the
traded goods sector deteriorated further because the
government stuck to the pre-announced crawling peg which
implied a further appreciation of the currency in real terms
(Table A3). Therefore, manufacturing output continued to
decline in 1980 while agricultural output was adversely
affected by low export prices and bad weather conditions.
Nevertheless, total GDP more or less stagnated in 1980 because
domestic expenditures on consumption and investment continued
to increase at a rate of about 6 p.c.
11. From December 1977 to December 1980, the Peso appreciated
by about 40 p.c. in real terms. In view of the persistently
high increases of domestic prices, devaluation expectations
became stronger in the course of 1980. Although the government
encouraged foreign lending by reducing both the risk (by pro-
viding an exchange rate guarantee) and the Peso cost of for-
eign borrowing (by maintaining an overvalued exchange rate),
there were massive capital outflows in the last quarter of- 12 -
1980 and in 1981 (Table A5). In February 1981, the Peso was
devalued by 10 per cent and a new exchange rate schedule was
announced which covered the subsequent seven months. This
time, credit policy was tightened severely in order to support
the exchange rate policy. However, these policy changes were
never fully applied since the Videla administration was
replaced by a new military government under General Viola in
March 1981 (Table 1) .
12. The new government abolished the crawling peg, and after
devaluing the Peso twice by 23 p.c, the exchange market was
split into a commercial market with a crawling peg on a daily
basis and a financial market with a freely floating exchange
rate in June 1981. On average, the real exchange rate rose
somewhat, but at the end of the year it was still some 25 p.c.
lower than in December 1977 (Table A3). Monetary expansion
remained moderate, but the fiscal deficit rose to about 16
p.c. of GDP, mainly because of the foreign exchange
guarantees granted to private borrowers. Deviating from
earlier policies, a sizable share of the public deficit was
financed by bond sales to the private sector. Higher interest
rates and crowding out paved the way to another downward slide
of the domestic economy. Imports fell by 36 p.c. from the 4th
quarter of 1980 to the 4th quarter of 1981 (Table A4), and the
rate of inflation remained at about 100 p.c. per annum.
13. Economic recession, high inflation and capital flight
brought a new administration under General Galtieri intoOte Welhvirtsdwft Kiel
- 13 -
office in December 1981 (Table 1). The foreign exchange market
was reunified and the exchange rate was allowed to float
freely. After a strong devaluation, capital outflows came
temporarily to a halt. The hike in import prices prevented the
rate of inflation from showing any abatement. Therefore, the
decline of real domestic expenditure continued at an
accelerated pace. In the second quarter of 1982, domestic
expenditures on consumption and investment were 17.5 p.c.
lower than a year ago.
At the outbreak of the Malvinas conflict in mid-1982, economic
policies were totally reversed once again. The exchange rate
regime changed several times, but, on balance, there was an
accelerated (real) devaluation of the Peso. The severe
recession, the lack of competitiveness, and the foreign
exchange burden contributed to a drastic deterioration of the
financial situation of the private sector. In order to save
borrowers and banks from default, the government entered into
large-scale refinancing of private debt through long-term
loans (6 years) at a highly negative real rate of interest in
mid-1982. The cost of bailing out private enterprises further
enlarged the public sector deficit which had already been
increased by previous rescue operations and by the military
conflict. The Central Bank refrained from any active role in
financial policy; monetary expansion was merely geared at
financing the public sector deficit and ensuring the liquidity
of the private sector. The foreign debt continued to increase
and reached US-$ 39.8 billion at the end of 1982 (Table 3),- 14 -
Table 3 - External Debt, Argentina 1978 - 1983
(Billions of US$)

























December. - Includes public and private sector arrears
amounting to US$ 2,104 and 656 million, respectively. -
Estimated (without interest payments).
Source: BCRA- 15 -
causing unsustainable debt service obligations. A stand-by
arrangement with the IMF, which wassupposed to provide relief,
was interrupted after only 9 months in autumn 1983, as the
government could not meet the conditions on which the arrange-
ment rested (mainly reduction of the budget deficit and
removal of trade restrictions as well as capital controls).
Inevitably, foreign commercial banks, which were prepared to
reschedule Argentina's debt parallel to IMF assistance,
stopped providing the required new finance.
III. Economic and Social Costs of Development Policies Applied
in Argentina
14. Despite the unperturbed outer appearance of a relatively
rich country, Argentina's growth record over the last 15 years
has been rather similar to that of an African country than to
economic development in other Latin American countries, not to
speak of Asian countries. Since 1975, real per capita income
has been declining more or less steadily at an annual average
rate of 1.3 p.c. Measured in prices of 1970, 1983 per capita
income was 4.5 p.c. lower than per capita income in 1970. Had
it not been for the wealth the country accumulated in the last
and at the beginning of this century, a loss of real income of
this magnitude would undoubtedly have caused much more concern
as it apparently did in Argentina up to now. Figure 2 shows
the deterioration in the relative income position of the coun-
try vis-a-vis other Latin American and Asian countries in a- 16 -
Figure 2 - Actual
a and,Projected Growth of Per Capita Income in
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aUntil 1982. - Projections for the 1982-1994 period are based on
average annual growth rates of the 1970-1982 period. -
Sources: World Bank (1984: 110-111); UK (1984: Special Table 1;
Table 1).- 17 -
period of only 12 years. Starting from an income level almost
twice as high as that of Brazil and Mexico in 1970, Argentina
has managed to draw roughly even with these countries in the
early 1980s and will fall far behind in another 12 year period
if past trends persist. Under this assumption, even such
countries as Malaysia and Korea which compared to Argentina
were at a rather early stage of economic development in 1970
are likely to have overtaken this country in terms of real per
capita income by 1994.
15. Many other countries have experienced a deterioration of
economic performance since the mid-70s, however, by far not as
pronounced as Argentina. In view of the relatively small share
of foreign trade in GDP and Argentina's endowment with natural
resources such as land and crude oil, it is hardly conceivable
that changes in foreign demand and supply or the oil price
hikes are responsible for the shock waves which repeatedly
went through the economy. The crises that struck Argentina
again and again were rather the result of structural deficien-
cies of the economy induced by the basic thrust of the devel-
opment strategy applied in the country and by misguided
short-term policy responses to market disequilibria. Concern-
ing the fundamentals of economic decision making, two major
elements can be singled out which have contributed to the
reoccurence of economic crises: the inward-orientation of
economic policies and the high degree of government inter-
ventions into virtually all markets.- 18 -
16. The strategy of import substitution already adopted after
the Great Depression has promoted the development of a highly
diversified industrial sector, but the lack of external and
partly also internal competition contributed to a wasteful use
of both capital and labour [Canitrot, 1974]. Argentina shares
this experience with many other countries which heavily relied
on import substitution to promote industrial expansion
[Kruger, 1983]. Industrial profits rather depended on access
to subsidized credit and public sector contracts than on
international competitiveness. The export promotion scheme
introduced in the late 1960s and the subsequent reduction of
the overall level of import protection achieved little with
respect to changing the basic structure of incentives . While
traditional labour- and skill-intensive industries showed some
positive responses in the early 1970s, the anti-export and
anti-agriculture bias of commercial and exchange rate policies
largely remained untouched. Furthermore, many measures
introduced to promote exports failed to yield the expected
results since trade policies implemented for short-term
balance-of-payments considerations were frequently offset by
exchange rate policies geared at lowering the rate of
According to Berlinski and Schydlowski [1982], the average
rate of effective protection on domestic sales for
manufacturing was reduced from 111 p.c. in 1969 to 3 9 p.c.
in 1977. The main problem in the latter year was the
dispersion of protection among industries which ranged from
negative rates of effective protection for some traditional
industries (tractors and agricultural equipment; tanning
material; durable household consumer goods) to very high
effective protection for some industrial and agricultural
intermediates as well as office machinery, communication
equipment, and motorcycles and bicycles. For the structure
of effective protection see also Nogues [1983] and FIEL
[1982]. The latter study shows that the high dispersion of
effective protection among industrial subsectors was
maintained in the 1980s.- 19 -
inflation. In such an economic environment, foreign direct
investment hardly contributed to the maturation of the
Argentine industry. Subsidiaries of foreign firms rather
adjusted to local technological standards and concentrated
their efforts on domestic sales.
17. For these reasons, the inward orientation of industrial
policies became a permanent source of balance-of-payments
problems. Many industrial enterprises considered exports more
or less as a residual arising from an excess of production
over domestic sales and, hence, every increase in domestic
absorption or slowdown of foreign demand was bound to create
wide fluctuations in industrial exports. Therefore, the
Argentine economy continued to rely heavily on revenues
derived from agricultural exports for the payment of its
import needs which had become increasingly complementary to
domestic production. Since international demand and prices for
agricultural goods also fluctuated considerably over time,
sharp swings in export revenues repeatedly interrupted the
supply of necessary imported inputs. Furthermore, the policy-
induced discrimination against agriculture combined with the
emergence of extremely protectionistic agricultural policies
in other countries particularly in Europe prevented an
agricultural export expansion in line with the import
requirements of the country.
18. The insufficient and uncertain supply of intermediate
inputs as well as the lack of competitive pressure reduced the- 20 -
need for continuous product innovations and the introduction
of new production techniques. The limited size of domestic
markets for manufactured goods prevented the realisation of
economies of scale and favoured the emergence of monopolistic
and oligopolistic market structures. Productivity of indus-
trial enterprises suffers from widespread X-inefficiency and
low rates of capacity utilization. Industrial productivity did
hardly increase in the 1980-83 period (Table A6). In agri-
culture, the introduction of new technologies based on the use
of chemical fertilizers is only in its early stages because of
an almost prohibitive tariff on fertilizer imports while such
technologies have been implemented in other countries since
long. Hectare productivity in wheat production, for example,
which used to be similar to productivity of US farmers at the
beginning of this century, now ranges about 30 p.c. below US
productivity [US Department of Agriculture, 1984].
19. The distortion of relative prices introduced by trade and
exchange rate policies was reinforced by direct government
intervention into financial, labour and goods markets such as
the gradual transfer of all major functions of the financial
sector to the Central Bank, administrative wage fixing and
restrictive labour regulations as well as quantitative
restrictions concerning imports and local production of
certain goods. These interventions were of an ad-hoc nature
and induced unpredictable fluctuations of relative prices
[Machinea, 1983]. High information costs resulting from the
necessity to live with or circumvent controls and a high- 21 -
degree of uncertainty about the next turn of government
policies created disincentives to private investment. Gross
domestic investment has declined by 45 p.c. since 1981 (Table
A4) and there are indications that private investment has been
reduced even more. Taking into account depreciation, private
net investment may have been negative since quite some time
suggesting that the country is eating up its capital stock. To
prevent a breakdown of the financial sector the government
stepped in several times to rescue a considerable number of
private enterprises and banks that were at the brink of bank-
ruptcy when real appreciations of the Peso destroyed the
competitiveness of domestic suppliers and threatened to lead
to a desintegration of the financial sector. It is estimated
that 200 of the 350 private and state banks as well as a
sizable share of industrial enterprises are bankrupt when
judged by standard accounting procedures. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that grey markets, in
particular a parallel market for US-$, are developing rapidly.
However, profits earned in these markets are classified as
illegal and will hardly be returning to the official economy
thus adding to the scarcity of investible funds. The same
applies to surpluses generated in the underground economy
which is estimated to amount to at least 30 p.c. of official
GDP.
20. The permanent instability in the basic orientation of
macro-economic policies can be traced by assessing the rever-
sals in major macro-economic policy instruments such as the- 22 -
public sector deficit, the rate of growth of money supply
(Ml), and real wages. The data presented in Table 2 show a
clear policy cycle. From the beginning of the 1970s to the
mid-1970s all policy variables tend to rise. This expansionary
phase is followed by a period of 4 to 5 years in which policy
variables are corrected downwards substantially. Finally, at
the end of the 1970s, policies again become increasingly ex-
pansionary. The existence of a policy cycle does not distin-
guish Argentina from other countries. However, in Argentina
the fluctuations are extremely strong since instability was
reinforced by the extensive and unpredictable use of regula-
tions and controls in all areas of the economy. This by itself
is sufficient to explain the fluctuations of overall output
and the successive waves of inflation (Figure 1). The basic
mechanism can be demonstrated with respect to public deficits
in relation to GDP growth.
21. Supporters of government policies may argue that public
deficits tended to increase at times of recession (e.g. 1975
and 1980-83) and helped to smooth output fluctuations caused
by other influences. However, large public sector deficits
went along with high deficits in the current account and an
increase in the rate of inflation, i.e. fiscal deficits were
normally increasing when demand pressures were already ex-
tremely high. The coincidence of a high budget deficit and
recession (in terms of production) resulted from the failure
of using the exchange rate in a proper way [Sjaastad, 1983].
By maintaining, an overvalued exchange rate Argentina has- 23 -
repeatedly reduced the profitability and the level of activity
in its traded goods sector. Overvaluation of the currency was
then combined with expansionary policies designed to stimulate
production. This policy mix made the situation even worse. It
resulted in strong wage pressure and accelerating inflation,
while the budget deficit widened because of price freezes for
public goods and rescue operations for private companies in
distress. And each time the crisis culminated, when the
balance-of-payments constraint finally forced the government -
often a new one - to devalue and to reduce demand pressures by
monetary and fiscal restriction. Given this policy cycle,
fiscal policy can hardly be considered as a stabilizing
element. The inconsistency of fiscal, exchange rate and wage
policies has been the major cause for the failures of
successive liberalization attempts in Argentina which have
burdened the debate on economic policies today with so many
deep-rooted prejudices.
22. Inconsistency and instability of policy making in
Argentina is a result of the preoccupation of successive
governments to favour one sector or segment of the economy
over the others instead of appealing to a broader social con-
sensus for its economic management . In the past 15 years,
military governments used to favour business, whereas populist
governments favoured labour. Later on, the respective govern-
This is clearly stated in Wynia [1978:247]: "The continual
failure of Argentine leaders to secure the cooperation of
private interests in the implementation of their economic
programs was not due to their excessive reliance on com-
petitive pluralism or corporatism, but their failure to
develop either, or any other system that linked policy
makers with their constituents."- 24 -
merits regularly had to reverse their policy either because the
pressure of trade unions for higher wages threatened to lead
to a major strike and political unrest or because the balance-
of-payments constraint forced the government to reorientate
policies. Since the government decides - at least nominally -
over prices and wages, it is exposed to strong pressures from
organized labour and specific interest groups which all do not
assume any political responsibility for the course of action
urged upon the government.
23. The incomes policies applied by various civilian and
military governments provide a good example on how good
intentions may have adverse effects under such circumstances.
Incomes policies were usually geared at improving the
distribution of income by raising the standard of living of
the work force. Data presented in Table A6 show that organized
labour has so far been sheltered from suffering real income
losses since real wages have been maintained at 1977 peak
levels. The relative income position of the organized sector
has been preserved by a reduction of formal employment (Table
A7) and by large-scale subsidy programs granted to industrial
and banking activities. The emergence of widespread
unemployment has been prevented by a rapid expansion of self-
employment in the service sector and, more recently, of public
employment.
24. The economic costs of these policies had to be borne by
those members of the society who are hit hardest by the- 25 -
inflation tax the government is levying on currency holdings
and demand deposits as well as on time deposits at negative
real rates of interest to finance the public sector deficit.
As the chance to protect oneself from negative effects of
inflation by investing in grey markets is open to a large
segment of the population and not just to the "happy few", it
is very difficult to trace the incidence of impoverishment to
one particular group. For this reason, there is so little
opposition voiced against the present economic system; many
can even gain from "speculative" investment opportunities
offered by high inflation while those carrying the burden are
scattered through many social groups and usually comprise the
weakest members of the society in terms of disposable income
and/or access to grey markets. People primarily concerned are
workers outside the organized labour market, i.e. so-called
self-employed workers particularly in the artificially
inflated service sector and agricultural labourers, as well as
owners and family helpers of smaller farms and small-scale
industries. Contrary to announced intentions, government
policies have not contributed to improving the distribution of
income but rather bolstered the income position of capital
owners and members at the labour force that could effectively
organize in pressure groups. It is not surprising that these
policies have a regional dimension as well. In poorer regions
of the country such as the Northern Provinces income losses
and unemployment rates have increased overproportionally
compared to Greater Buenos Aires [FIEL, 1984].- 26 -
25. The lessons to be drawn from this experience is twofold.
If more stability in economic policies is to be achieved,
economic planning has to be based on improving the productive
potential of the economy as a whole rather than the well-being
of certain groups. Such a strategy will eventually benefit all
members of the society and not just those groups protected by
the respective government. To gain the freedom to implement
such a strategy, the government has to reduce its almost total
control (and responsibility) over the economy. It cannot fix
wages, prices, and the exchange rate independently of each
other and at the same time please all parties concerned.
Instead, central parameters of economic development should be
determined autonomously either by market forces or by groups
directly involved such as trade unions and employers.
IV. Argentina 1984: On the Road to Hyperinflation?
26. The economic situation the Alfonsin government inherited
from its predecessor could have hardly been worse. Foreign
debt had accumulated to some 45 billion US-$ and interest
payments alone amounted to about 7 p.c. of GDP or 60 p.c. of
export revenues. If amortization and repayment of short-term
debt is included debt service required about 250 p.c. of
export revenues in 1983. The total public sector deficit is
estimated to have amounted to more than 20 p.c. of GDP at the
end of 1983 and was totally financed by the Central Bank.
Consumer prices rose at a monthly rate of 17.7 p.c. in- 27 -
December 1983 and were 433.7 p.c. higher than a year ago
(Table A8). Real wages had been pushed up to a new peak in
December 1983, thus fuelling - together with an acceleration
of monetary expansion and the growing uncertainty with respect
to economic prospects - a consumption boom. Real GDP and
industrial production rose by 3 and 9 p.c. respectively in
198 3; investment, however, continued to decline by almost 8
p.c. (Table A4). At the end of 1983, total gross investment
was about 45 p.c. lower than three years ago and hardly
sufficient to cover replacement needs.
27. Financial markets had suffered greatly from the acceler-
ation of inflation. Due to the high opportunity costs of
holding money (notes and coins plus demand deposits) and due
to negative real rates of interest on time deposits (Table
A9), the volume of financial markets had been shrinking.
Measured in real terms, the holdings of financial assets were
some 50 p.c. lower in 1983 than in 1980 and the ratio of M2 to
GDP had dropped from 25.4 to 12.4 p.c. (Table A10). As in
other countries during inflationary processes, the average
maturity of time deposits had shortened dramatically as a
result of rising inflationary expectations. More than 90 p.c.
of all time deposits carried a maturity of less than 30 days.
Any medium- or long-term capital market had disappeared. In
order to safeguard the purchasing power of their savings,
households turned increasingly to more inflation-proof assets
like real estate, gold or "greenbacks". US-Dollar balances
within the country were estimated to amount to 3-5 bill. US-$.- 28 -
Because of the massive increase in the monetary base (Table
All) resulting from financing the huge public deficit by money
creation, bank credit had already been restricted severely in
1982 by reserve requirements of 100 p.c. and narrow rediscount
facilities. Thus, the banking system was prevented from
performing its original task of channelling funds into the
economy and was mainly used as an instrument to collect the
inflation tax .
28. Foreign trade was totally dominated by the lack of
foreign exchange. In view of the inability to service external
debt, there was no access to additional funds from abroad at
the end of 1983. Severe restrictions had already been imposed
on imports and import permits were only granted for inter-
mediate inputs not available in the domestic market. Despite
of the recovery of domestic expenditure there continued to be
a surplus in the trade balance in 1983 (Table A12). However,
this was mainly due to enforced import restrictions, which
caused the volume of imports to decline faster than exports.
On the whole, the economy was virtually closed at the end of
1983.
29. Faced with the disastrous consequences of past policies,
the new government did very little to reverse economic trends.
It refrained from any decisive move towards fighting inflation
For a detailed description and analysis of the financial
market in Argentina see Fischer, Trapp [1984a]. The effects
of the inflation tax on the financial sector, economic
growth and income distribution are discussed in Fischer,
Trapp [1984b].- 29 -
and rather attempted to stick to its election promise of
raising real wages by 4 to 6 p.c. over and above the December-
198 3 level. In order to make real wage increases bearable to
private enterprises, the government tried to reduce capital
cost by further lowering already negative real rates of
interest in January and February 1984. However, it became soon
obvious that this policy was not sustainable. It resulted in
enforced financial disintermediation, widespread misuse of
funds borrowed at the controlled rate, and an expansion of
grey capital markets. Therefore, priority has recently been
shifted from raising the level of real wages in general to a
policy of increasing real minimum wages and granting cost-of-
living adjustments to higher wage brackets, thus aiming at a
reduction of wage differentials.
30. The only attempt of the government to reduce inflation
concerned the introduction of price controls for industrial
products immediately after the election . In spite of these
price controls the rate of inflation rose to an annual rate of
1076 p.c. in August, which clearly demonstrates the ineffec-
tiveness of the price controls. Their major effects have been
additional distortions of the price structure and dis-
incentives to industrial production. Presently, the government
is trying to establish some kind of concerted action
(concertaci6n) to achieve a broader concensus in wage
A set of prices in each company is directly controlled and
price increases due to higher production costs have to be
negotiated with the government. For another set of prices
there is more flexibility, but any individual price increase
must not exceed the average rate of inflation (as measured
by the CPI).- 30 -
and price policies. Given the populistic policy stance of the
government, this so-called socio-economic pact will hardly be
meant as a substitute for wage and price controls, but rather
provide a new instrument to facilitate the implementation of
additional regulations.
31. Concerning the foreign exchange market, the multiple
exchange rate system has been maintained and the Peso has
been devalued gradually over the last months. The rate of
devaluation was oriented at the expected rate of inflation.
However, since inflation was underestimated considerably, the
real exchange rate appreciated by about 12 p.c. between
December 1983 and May 1984 (Table A3). The relative decline of
export prices added to the disincentives to output expansion
and investment introduced by domestic price controls. In order
to return to the real exchange-rate level of December 198 3,
the devaluation of the Peso has been accelerated since April
1984. Up to now, however, exchange rate adjustments are badly
lagging behind the increase of the inflation rate. Due to
declining exports the government was forced to cut down
imports sharply. There has been no indication of any discern-
ible trade policy or of considerations in that direction over
the last months.
32. According to official estimates, the budget deficit has
This system includes a commercial rate for industrial
exports and special rates for agricultural exports which are
kept by 15 to 25 p.c. below the commercial rate.- 31 -
been reduced from more than 20 p.c. of GDP in the last quarter
of 1983 to about 8 p.c. in the second quarter of 1984.
Adjusted for delayed payments, however, the deficit is likely
to be much higher. In addition, a substantial deficit is run
by the public financial sector, which is not included in the
official estimate. On the whole, there are no clear-cut
indications of any sustained reduction of the deficit. On the
expenditure side, there have been some cuts of military
expenditures and of investment projects while wage and salary
payments which account for about one third of total public
outlays have been boosted substantially because public
employment and public real wages have been raised by a
significant margin after the election. On the revenue side,
relief was expected from the increase of relative prices for
public services and higher taxes on gasoline consumption. The
latter, however, has - at least in the short run - failed to
improve revenues since gasoline consumption was reduced
significantly. Higher revenues were also expected from a
resumption of normal tax payments which had dropped off
steeply at the end of 1983 because of an expected tax amnesty
after the election. Instead, tax evasion increased and tax
payments were delayed to gain from accelerating inflation. The
percentage share of gain revenues in GDP declined from 33.6
p.c. in 1983 to 30.3 p.c. in the first half of 1984. For these
reasons, it is not very likely that there has been a major
reduction of the public sector deficit. The more or less
unabated expansion of Central Bank credit to the government
leads to the same conclusion. Currency in circulation which is- 32 -
a good proxy for the money creation has more than tripled
since December 1983.
33. On the whole, the economic policy of the new government
can only be described as a. zick-zack course. A medium-term
economic program has been announced several times but has not
been presented yet. Likewise, the government did not come to
terms with the IMF over the conditions for a stand-by agree-
ment. Conflicting statements of members of the government
concerning medium-term directions of economic policies have
increased uncertainty and further dampened the propensity of
the private sector to invest. Obviously, economic policy is
geared at maintaining some kind of status quo. It appears that
the government is hoping to outlive the crisis by a strategy
of "muddling through" until a more favourable international
environment, i.e. lower real interest rates in the US and a
devaluation of the US-$, would help to overcome the present
problems.
34. The fundamental misconceptions of this approach are the
belief that the economic crisis in Argentina is not home-made
but imported, and the disregard for the economic and social
costs of present economic policies. If the government con-
tinues on its present course, an economic collapse is
inevitable. The time for a strategy of "muddling through" has
run out because of the disastrous economic situation inherited
from previous governments. The high and persistent public
deficit is threatening to push the country into hyperinfla-- 33 -
tion. The inflation tax, which is equivalent to the rate of
inflation for non-interest-bearing money and to the negative
real rate of interest on time deposits, has already been
exploited excessively. Currency substitution and investment in
indexed and real assets have increasingly eroded the base on
which the inflation tax is levied. The ratio of Ml to GDP
declined from more than 12 p.c. at the beginning of the 70s to
7.7 p.c. in 1980 and less than 4 p.c. in the first half of
1984 (Table A10). Since the public sector deficit was not
reduced substantially, inflation had to accelerate over the
last months.
35. The decline of real money balances and the acceleration
of inflation have reached dimensions in Argentina comparable
to those observed in other countries at the beginning of
hyperinflationary processes [Sargent, 1982; Cagan, 1956], The
Argentine economy is approaching a point where a sustained
high public deficit will push the rate of inflation to a level
at which yields from the inflation tax are no longer
sufficient to finance the deficit . At this point galopping
inflation turns into hyperinflation as the government will
print money at an accelerated pace in a futile attempt to
satisfy the budgetary needs. Hyperinflation means that
According to estimates by Fernandez and Rodriguez [1984] the
inflation tax in terms of GDP will fall when inflation
exceeds a monthly rate of 30.8 p.c. However, this seems to
be a rather optimistic estimate; with accelerating currency
substitution, hyperinflation may already start at a lower
rate of inflation.- 34 -
- the monetary system breaks down, because everybody will
refuse to accept domestic money;
- goods disappear from all markets and will be kept in
hoardings;
- trade will only be possible on a barter basis;
- regular production activities will cease to exist because
wages cannot be paid any longer and people will chase after
any chance to provide themselves with a minimum of-goods and
services; and
- the public sector will fall apart because it has no means to
finance its needs.
36. Any further attempt to maintain the status quo will
inevitably drive Argentina into an economic catastrophy which
threatens to destroy the political system and the social
fabric of the society as well. Both the general public and the
political leaders have to acknowledge these grim perspectives.
To secure its own survival and the survival of the democratic
system as such, the Alfonsin government has no choice but to
reverse its economic policies.- 35 -
V. A Stabilization Cum Restructuring Program
a) The Basic Approach
37. More than just a few ad-hoc stabilization measures are
required to save Argentina from economic collapse and to
reestablish the international creditworthiness of the
country. Policy reform has to be geared towards achieving a
number of goals simultaneously and as fast as possible to
avoid hyperinflation and to stop the process of impoverish-
ment. These goals are:
- Restoration of confidence in government policies and their
continuity to reduce uncertainty in economic decision
making;
- A substantial relaxation of inflationary pressure without
which no other policy can be implemented successfully;
- A revival of foreign trade to facilitate debt servicing;
and
- An elimination of price distortions to open up new invest-
ment opportunities and to improve productivity growth.
38. In pursuing these goals, the severe imbalances in the
Argentine economy have to be taken into account which require
a high degree of complementarity and a careful timing of
policy changes. Conventional stabilization policies frequently
applied in the past and now again recommended by the IMF are
For a more policy-oriented outline of the reform package,
see Donges [1984].- 36 -
insufficient to solve the economic problems, of Argentina and
may even have unwarranted side-effects. The IMF mainly
suggests a cut of the public deficit, a "managed" devaluation
of the currency and a complete deregulation of interest rates.
The economic history of the country shows that exchange-rate
policies geared towards devaluation of the Peso succeeded at
best in the very short run and have rather contributed to wild
fluctuations of the real exchange rate (Table A3). Concerning
interest rates, there is a well founded fear that an immediate
full deregulation would lead to a collapse of the financial
market with disastrous consequences for the banking sector and:
many industrial enterprises which entirely rely on subsidized
credit from the government. And most importantly, IMF
recommendations lack a structural component which would reduce
the severe distortions in the economy introduced by direct
government intervention.
39. The emergency package presented in this paper aims at a
combination of economic stabilization with structural adjust-
ment. In view of existing institutional and political con-
straints, it is suggested to proceed in two steps: a) a short-
term stabilization program which includes some initial meas-
ures to encourage a reallocation of resources and b) a medium-
term structural adjustment program to be applied when some
degree of stabilization has been achieved. This paper focuses
on the short-term program which would have to include a sudden
and drastic reduction of the public sector deficit, a freely
floating exchange rate, a strengthening of the free capital- 37 -
market, elimination of price controls, and some degree of
import liberalization to support export expansion. Other
important measures needed for Argentina's return to sustained
economic growth (para 56) have to be postponed until the
government has regained the freedom to implement adjustment
policies which is lost in the present state of the economy.
b) Reduction of Public Sector Deficits
40. The piecemeal approach to expenditure cuts applied by the
present government has to be replaced by a sweeping immediate
cut of public expenditures to reduce inflation and inflation-
ary expectations. Fighting inflation is the key to any econom-
ic improvement in the country since only drastically lower
rates of inflation would enable the government to loosen its
almost total control of the economy. The restoration of a
sound government budget calls for expenditure cuts, a ceiling
on the expansion of subsidy programs largely channeled through
the Central Bank, and a reduction of direct government parti-
cipation in economic activities. Equally important are
improvements of tax collection to prevent a further decline of
the share of tax revenues in GDP. However, higher taxes are no
alternative to a review of expenditures since they are likely
to increase price distortions and, hence, hardly produce
higher revenues. The government should, nevertheless, consider
certain changes of the tax structure which will have a
positive effect on revenues at least in the medium term.- 38 -
41. Prime candidates for budget cuts are
(1) public investment in projects with doubtful economic
returns (such as most energy and infrastructure pro-
jects) ;
(2) subsidy programs which at present ensure the survival of
many industrial enterprises or banks (without preventing
the decline of the respective sectors as a whole; Table
A13). Many of these programs are granted through
financial institutions and increase in volume almost
automatically;
(3) public enterprises producing large deficits as a result
of conflicting targets imposed on these enterprises. With
given price and wage policies, they will continue to be a
heavy drain on public resources. Therefore, they should
be established as independent production units with
clearly defined responsibilites and the freedom to charge
cost-covering prices;
(4) military expenditure which includes a number of activ-
ities not directly related to the defense of the country
such as large parts of "Fabricaciones Militares". These
activities could be turned into independent public enter-
prises or transferred to the private sector;
For a more detailed discussion of some of the subsequent
suggestions, see Petrei [1983].- 39 -
(5) public employment which was again augmented heavily under
the new government (Table A7);
(6) public wages and salaries which have frequently been
spearheading wage increases in other economic sectors.
There is no rationale for a wage leadership of the public
sector.
42. On the revenue side, steps should be taken by the
government
(1) to improve the effectiveness of the tax collection system
in order to reduce widespread delays in tax payments and
tax evasion;
(2) to abstain from any fiscal amnesty (blanqueo) because it
punishes honest tax payers and erodes tax moral;
(3) to review the numerous tax exemptions now distorting the
tax structure;
(4) to change the tax structure by lowering the value added
tax and eliminating the tax on agricultural exports (para
44) in exchange for a broader coverage of the income tax
and a newly introduced land tax.
43. A reduction of the public deficit will immediately ease
inflationary pressure which is a prerequisite to restoring- 40 -
financial markets. Ceilings on subsidies and privatization of
at least some public or military enterprises would provide a
potential for the expansion of viable private enterprises and
create new investment opportunities. Recessionary effects of
expenditure cuts are considered to be mild if budgetary
policies are accompanied by incentives for output expansion
and for investment through an adjustment of relative prices.
c) Elimination of Price Distortions
44. In 1984, Argentina is a virtually closed economy, where
all major goods and factor prices are fixed independently of
each other by government intervention. The domestic currency
is grossly overvalued heavily discriminating against exports
in general and agricultural exports in particular, while
erratic adjustments of domestic prices cause uncertainty,
lower the propensity to invest, and inflate the size of the
(non-traded) service sector. If confidence in the country's
economic performance is to be restored and exports are to be
increased to facilitate debt servicing, major price dis-
tortions have to be removed. The first and most important step
in this direction would be to abolish the present system of
multiple fixed exchange rates and to allow the exchange rate
to be determined by market forces. The subsequent devaluation
will not only encourage exports and reduce capacity under-
utilization in manufacturing, higher export revenues will also
speed up the introduction of improved technologies in agri-- 41 -
culture (including the use of chemical fertilizers). Moderni-
zation in agriculture and agricultural export expansion should
be further supported by the substitution of a land tax for the
present export tax on agricultural products . This tax would
provide an incentive for land holders to make productive use
of the available land and punish those holding land simply for
speculative reasons.
45. If exports are to expand significantly some degree of
import liberalization will be inevitable. The present ban on
all imports for which domestic substitutes are available and
the highly selective nature of interventions in import markets
prevent any substantial increase of industrial production
since the necessary supply of intermediate inputs and capital
goods is not assured. A reform of import restrictions should
be based on a more positive attitude of the government towards
foreign competition and include initially:
a substitution of tariffs for quantitative import
restrictions (as was done successfully in Turkey;
[Gonensay, 1984]) and
a reduction of the (effective) discrimination against
exports by either lowering import tariffs or establishing
a refund or draw-back scheme commensurate with artifi-
cially increased import prices.
On August 12, 1984 the President has announced in a public
speech the intention of his government to abolish the export
tax on meat by October of this year.- 42 -
46. The reform of the price structure which is to create new
investment opportunities and more productive jobs than hither-
to provided in the service sector also has to include the
elimination of the present system of ex-factory price
controls. This system has proven to be unable to contain
inflation. Furthermore, selective control of some product
prices distorts the structure of production and - with a
monthly rate of inflation of more than 20 p.c. - creates wind-
fall profits for the trade sector. Price negotiations are
highly arbitrary and consume a substantial amount of public
and private resources. Abolishing price controls will most
certainly result in higher ex-factory prices which is desir-
able to encourage capacity utilization and production growth
as well as to compensate private companies for the phasing out
of government subsidies. Higher ex-factory prices do, however,
not mean a new wave of inflation. Most of these price
increases will go at the expense of excessive trade margins
and hardly affect retail prices.
d) Financial Sector Reform
47. With reserve requirements of almost 100 p.c. on deposits,
the banking sector had to abandon its role in collecting and
reallocating financial resources. The banks have become sub-
sidiaries of the Central Bank which guarantees deposits at
fixed maximum interest rates and offers preferential credit -
almost the only source of credit in the country by now. The
Cuenta de Regulaci6n Monetaria, the vehicle for steering- 43 -
financial markets and collecting the inflation tax, can, how-
ever, not be abolished until the public deficit and inflation
have been substantially reduced and the banking sector has
been revived. A relaxation of reserve requirements does not
provide a policy option for the time being since the resulting
additional money supply would fuel inflation and offset the
effects of a declining public deficit on money supply. But
even if the restoration of a truly independent banking sector
rather constitutes a long-term option, some immediate policy
changes are required to increase the supply of voluntary
savings to the financial sector and to improve the allocation
of financial resources.
48. At subsidized interest rates demand for credit overshoots
supply and results in credit rationing. The arbitrary element
inherent in such decisions greatly reduces the economic effi-
ciency of credit allocation. As an approximation to the long-
term goal of liberalizing interest rates it is suggested to
strengthen the existing parallel markets and to freeze or
better reduce the size of the officially controlled market for
preferential credit. A number of measures can be implemented
to this end while anti-inflationary budget policies are
pursued:
(1) interest rate policies on the official market that sup-
port a positive real rate of interest for all new credit
arrangements;- 44 -
(2) an increase in the volume of indexed deposits private
banks are allowed to offer combined with a gradual re-
duction of the guarantee against losses by bank default
the Central. Bank now grants to all such deposits. This
policy would increase voluntary savings as well as the
amount of credit banks can offer at free interest rates
while banks are forced to compete for deposits; . . >.
(3) The same purpose is served by an increase in the volume
of bank acceptances which is now severely restricted.
49. Such measures would impose a more active role on the
banking sector in the allocation of credit, and thus increase
competition among those demanding credit and among the banks
themselves. The latter aspect is very important to return to
sound banking practices and to reverse the current trend to
financial disintermediation. It is recognized that some
special arrangements may be needed with respect to outstanding
debt at highly preferential interest rates. This debt will
have to be phased out gradually without burdening the banking
sector with a default risk.- 45 -
50. An alternative to this rather moderate reform of the
financial sector is a currency reform which is under con-
sideration among some economists in Argentina. It has to be
stressed that such a drastic monetary reform cannot substitute
the above recommendations with respect to public deficits,
foreign trade and relative prices. The experience with cur-
rency reform in countries such as Austria, Germany, Hungary
and Poland proves that the success of those reforms depended
in particular on a simultaneous return to sound budgetary
policies [Lutz, 1949; Wallich, 1955]. The policy changes
applied in those countries were much more painful than any-
thing suggested in this paper. Another important aspect of
currency reform concerns the required institutional changes.
To be successful, the reform has to include among other things
the establishment of an independent Central Bank which issues
the new currency . If such an institutional innovation is
deemed feasible, the introduction of a parallel currency may
be preferred to the substitution of the old for a new currency
in order to minimize the problems arising in the transition
period. It has to be left open at this stage whether enough
political will could be mobilized in Argentina to support such
a far-reaching policy initiative.
e) Macro-Economic Effects of Policy Reform
51. The effects of any policy reform in Argentina have to be
An example is the introduction of the German "Rentenmark" in
1923. See Netzband, Widmaier [1964].- 46 -
judged against the costs of continuing present policies (para
35). There is no policy option benefitting all segments of
the economy simultaneously. Yet, the above proposed emergency
package paves the way toward achieving high and stable rates
of economic growth which will also allow increases of real
wages without detrimental effects on price stability and out-
put growth. Argentina is extremely well endowed for a quick
economic revival (better than other heavily indebted Latin
American countries) since the country is rich in natural
resources (oil, land); has a well educated labour force; could
mobilize a hidden reserve of financial capital (3-5 billion
US-$ hoarded at home and 20-30 billion US-$ invested abroad);
and - most importantly - has shown a high degree of
responsiveness to changes of economic incentives even in the
very short term, particulary in agriculture. This is demon-
strated in Figure 3 with respect to the export performance.
Export volumes increased rapidly at times when the discrimi-
nation against exports by over-valued exchange rates was
absolished, e.g. in 1976 and 1981. This experience
suggests that economic adjustment can be achieved in Argentina
at much lower economic costs than in other countries.
52. A reduction of the public deficit together with policies
promoting foreign trade (a free exchange rate, lower import
protection and eliminating the agricultural export tax) will
effect both the level and the structure of supply, demand, and
prices. On the demand side, the recessionary impact of
expenditure cuts is countered by an increase in external- 47 -
p.c.
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demand. More importantly, however, there are supply side
effects associated with a reduction of existing price
distortions. A clear-cut policy change with respect to public
expenditures, export discrimination and import protection will
break inflationary and rent seeking mentalities and favourably
influence a better use of installed capacity and the pro-
pensity to invest. It is expected that efficiency of indus-
trial production can be raised substantially if bottlenecks
due to the lack of imported intermediate goods and capital
goods can be removed. Taking these factors together, the
recessionary impact of the proposed measures is supposed to be
mild and shortlived.
53. The devaluation of the currency and the elimination of
the export taxes induce a once-for-all increase of prices of
tradables partly offsetting the disinflationary effects of
expenditure cuts in the first round. The budgetary policies
will nonetheless arrest the rate of continuous price increases
and eventually stabilize the price level. Simultaneously, the
structure of relative prices is going to shift in favour of
traded goods in general and exports in particular. These
shifts ecourage a reallocation of resources from the tertiary
sector to industrial and agricultural activities and induce
the urgently needed reduction of the share of total
consumption in GDP.
54. First round effects on real wages are twofold: the
initial price increases resulting from exchange rate and trade- 49 -
policies tend to reduce real wages while decreasing rates of
inflation lower the inflation tax and, hence, positively
effect real disposable income in particular of low income
groups. But even if a temporary decline of real wages during
the adjustment process seems to be unavoidable, it should be
kept in mind that real wages in the organized sector were
maintained at high levels (paras 23, 24) although per capita
GDP declined since 1975 and the burden of servicing foreign
debt has increased substantially. Furthermore, suggested
policy changes do not place the burden of adjustment costs
solely on organized labour as has been the case with previous
stabilization attempts. Lower government subsidies to industry
and banking and diminished chances to reep speculation gains
from high rates of inflation is going to stop the transfer of
net wealth from the public sector (i.e. tax payers) to the
non-agricultural private sector which is taking place under
the present system. And finally, structural adjustment does
not only create new investment opportunities, but also pro-
ductive jobs which ultimately allow higher wage increases than
achievable under the present structure of relative prices.
55. Economic recovery is expected to be led by increases in
agricultural output and a higher capacity utilization in the
industrial sector. Private net investment in fixed capital
assets which is now negative in real terms will gradually pick
up fuelled by a decline in hoarding and an eventual repatria-
tion of financial funds invested abroad. The prerequisite to
attracting financial capital is a positive real rate of- 50 -
interest as suggested above (para 48). Interest rate induced
capital inflows put a downward pressure on the real exchange
rate which could erode the competitive position of export
activities and, thus, reverse the inflow of financial capital.
However, if the government abstains from interventions into
the foreign exchange markets (i.e. does not buy foreign
exchange to prevent a revaluation of the Peso) such a detri-
mental outcome is unlikely. A steady course of the Central
Bank with respect to monetary policies can prevent an infla-
tionary increase of domestic money supply while higher imports
made possible by some degree of import liberalization will
mitigate the revaluationary pressure of capital inflows. The
government should be prepared to accept a temporary deficit in
the current account to accelerate productive investment based
on imported capital goods and to limit the inflow of specula-
tive capital. Once new investments go into operation and
export growth is accelerating, the current account deficit
will automatically be eliminated.
56. The stabilization cum restructuring program paves the way
to a fundamental recovery of the Argentine economy which could
be accomplished in a year's time. Concerning structural
change, incentives are given to reduce the propensity to con-
sume, to expand the private sector of the economy, to produce
for international rather than domestic markets, and to re-
establish a sound financial sector. In the medium term the
proposed measures will, however, not be sufficient to bring
about those changes of the structure of production which are- 51 -
necessary to ensure a stable and healthy economic performance
of the country in the longer term. The degree of government
intervention into many markets will still be high and a
substantial share of the industrial and the banking sector
will remain inefficient by international standards. Necessary
medium-term adjustment policies concern
- import protection which should be gradually lowered dispro-
portionately so as to reduce dispersion of effective pro-
tection among subsectors;
- financial markets which should be fully liberalized by
abolishing the regulation of interest rates, the deposit
guarantee scheme, and the Cuenta de Regulaci&n Monetaria;
the latter should be replaced by a fractional reserve
system;
- labour markets where wage determination should be left to
trade unions and employers.
Such policy reforms, which by no means will be painless, can,
however, be implemented with greater ease once the present
downward spiralling trend of economic development in Argentina
has been reversed.- 52 -
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Table A2 - Export and Import Volumes, Argentina 1970-1984/1


















































Table A3 - Rate of Inflation and Real Exchange Rate, Argentina
Dec. 1976 - Aug. 1984
Monthly Per- Correspond- Real Exchange Rate
















































































Based on a currency basket. - Preliminary.
Source: FIEL, IEERAL and unpublished IMF estimates.- 59 -












































































































































6.2 -24.3 0.1 -9.9
Source: BCRA.- 60 -























































































Minus sign indicates outflow. - Portfolio investment included.
Net errors and omissions included.



































































1970 = 100. - Output per working hour.



























































 CSeasonal adjusted, 1976 = 100. -
















































































































Greater Buenos Aires; in p.c. of the labor force; annual
averages; Figures do not include "underemployed persons".
1st quarter 1984.
Source: FIEL, INDEC, Ministry of Economics.- 63 -
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Controlled Free Controlled Free
Rate Rate Rate Rate
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aDeflated by the CARTBCO price index. - Interest rates on bank acceptances.
cDeflated by the CPI.
Source: El Cronista Comercial (1984); Own calculations.- 65 -
Table A10 - Liquidity Coefficients , Argentina 1970-1984






























































Monetary aggregates deflated by the index of wholesale
prices (1970 = 100) divided by real GDP at market prices,
-
 b 1st half of 1984.
Source; BCRA, FIEL.- 66 -
Table All - Monetary Aggregates , Argentina 1970-1984
(Percentage changes)






























































aAnnual averages. - Not adjusted for changes in reserve
ratios. - Currency in circulation plus demand deposits. -
d e
Ml plus interest bearing deposits. - 1st half of 1984
over 1st half of 1983.
Source: BCRA.- 67 -


































































































































1st half of 1983
Source: IFS.Table A13 - Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin, Argentina 1971-1984/1
- Average annual rates of growth, p.c. -
















































































































































Electricity, Gas and Water
Commerce, Restaurants and Hotels
Transport and Communication
Banking
Government and Other Services
aAt 1970 prices;
 blst quarter 1984
Source: BCRA; Own calculations.
1970-1974
13.3
2.3
27.9
6.1
2.5
14.8
11.2
7.4
14.5
over 1st quarter
1975-1979
13.5
2.3
26.7
6.8
3.1
14.2
13.1
7.5
15.0
1983.
1980-1982
13.8
2.6
23.2
6.3
3.8
13.9
11.0
8.9
15.9
1983
15.2
2.8
24.1
4.7
4.3
12.9
11.3
7.6
17.0